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METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE STUDY 
OF BROADER CONSEQUENCES 
THOMAS GEHRING 
University of Bamberg 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The study of the broader effects of international regimes is just 
beginning. For a long time, regime analysts operated with a two-fold fiction, 
namely that a regime could be established largely in isolation from other 
regimes and that its consequences were concentrated to its own domain. In 
the real world, the international system is increasingly densely populated by 
international governing institutions. A study elaborated for the Rio Summit 
of 1992 counted more than 125 important multilateral environmental 
regimes alone, most of which were institutionalized separately from each 
other (Sand 1992). Every year, states conclude about five new important 
environmental agreements (Beisheim et al. 1999: 350 - 51). Against the 
backdrop of this trend and the sheer number of independently established 
international regimes, it is difficult to image that interaction among regimes 
is an irrelevant phenomenon. 
Moreover, regime analysts have long established that the effects of 
international regimes are frequently not limited to adaptations of behavior. 
Quite often, institutions influence the preferences of relevant actors 
(Oberthiir 1997). It is difficult to believe that these secondary consequences 
are always entirely limited to a regime's own domain (Levy et al. 1995: 308 
- 12). It may well be that an international regime affects the structure of a 
domestic political system. In addition, modern international regimes include. 
beyond a set of substantive norms regulating collectively desired behavior, 
collective decision-making systems (Young 1999a: 24 - 49.) Their 
proliferation may empower non-state actors or otherwise have an impact on 
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interaction within the international system far beyond the issue-areas 
regulated by the particular regimes (Princen and Finger 1994). 
The study of the broader consequences sets out to question, and replace 
where necessary, the fiction both of the isolated operation of international 
regimes and of the limitation of their effects to their own issue-area. Broader 
consequences research focuses on regime effects that occur beyond a given 
regime and the issue area governed by it. It is an attempt to expand the study 
of regime effectiveness to those effects that have been ignored so far. Thus, 
it deals with an object of inquiry that is located at the margin of classical 
regime analysis. Moreover, this object is negatively defined. The new field 
of regime analysis constitutes first and foremost a residual category that 
collects numerous different side effects and externalities of regime 
governance. 
Having been ignored by classical regime analysis does not imply that the 
broader effects of international regimes have altogether escaped the attention 
of international relations scholars. There are several strands of literature on 
which the study of broader consequences may draw. Within the literature on 
transnational relations, attention has been drawn to the importance of non-
state actors for the establishment and development of international regimes. 
This is true for environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
(Princen 1994; Clark 1994); human rights NGOs (Price 1998); "epistemic 
communities" (Haas 1990); or "advocacy networks" (Keck and Sikking 
1998). Although is has been observed that transnational actors of this type 
regularly emerge in the context of international regimes (Risse-Kappen 
1995: 28 - 32), the emphasis of systematic inquiry has been on the influence 
of non-state actors on regime decision making, rather than on the effects of 
regime establishment on the emergence and development of these actors. 
Likewise, International Relations has a long tradition in analyzing the impact 
of the international system on domestic society. This "second image 
reversed" research (Gourevich 1978) currently explores, for example, the 
effects of "internationalization" or "globalization" on domestic society 
(Garrett 1998; Scharpf 1999) and on domestic political systems. Whereas 
internationalization and globalization are not least consequences of the 
effectiveness of international institutions, especially of the world trade 
system (GATTAVTO) (Milner and Keohane 1996: 22 - 24), authors of this 
strand of literature usually do not distinguish between the broader 
consequences of one or more international regimes and other sources of 
internationalization and globalization. 
This is also true for the intensive discussion on the changing nature of 
state sovereignty (Litfin 1997) and the transformation of the originally 
"Westphalian" nation-state into some "post-Westphalian" entity (Caporaso 
1996). However, if this debate is moved into the context of European 
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integration, it is immediately related to the influence of the European Union, 
that is an (admittedly quite specific) institution for governance beyond the 
nation-state. Within the integration literature, it is hotly debated whether the 
European Union strengthens the state vis-ä-vis domestic society (Moravcsik 
1994; Grande 1996), or whether it undermines its ability to control internal 
and external affairs by providing non-state actors with additional 
opportunities for action (Marks et al. 1996; Stone Sweet and Sandholtz 
1997). Similar effects on domestic political systems are also produced by 
international regimes, albeit at a lower scale (Wolf 1999). The study of the 
broader regime consequences may thus draw on several existing literatures 
that address related issues. It promises to contribute to these literatures by 
adding a particular regime perspective. In remarkable contrast, research on 
the interaction of international regimes that co-exist within the international 
system is largely absent. 
This chapter addresses a number of methodological issues concerning the 
study of broader consequences. In the light of the residual nature as well as 
the novelty of the object of inquiry, it will be difficult, and cannot be the 
purpose of the present paper, to identify a common methodology or 
analytical approach that is suited to cover the study of all broader 
consequences alike. The goal will be more modest. This chapter shall 
systematize different sub-fields of the study of broader consequences and 
identify research strategies. Section 2 starts with the brief outline of a 
conceptual framework for the identification of broader consequences that 
takes process components duly into account. Section 3 then discusses 
promising dependent and independent variables in an attempt to systematize 
the heterogeneous field of study. In its final part, section 4 addresses a 
number of methodological problems of some priority fields of broader 
consequences research. 
The chapter concludes that the study of the broader consequences of 
international regimes opens a multifaceted and fascinating new field of 
research on the effects of international governing institutions. 
2. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
STUDY OF BROADER CONSEQUENCES 
It has become almost usual in the context of research on the simple 
effectiveness of international regimes to consider a regime as an instrument 
established by interested actors to bring about change. In this perspective, a 
regime consists of a set of norms that define the obligations of member 
states (see also the "consensus definition", Krasner 1982: 186). "Effects" are 
then conceptualized as changes in behavior of relevant actors caused by 
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these norms (outcomes) as well as changes in the target of regime-assisted 
cooperation, for example in trade flows or the quality of the waters of a 
regional sea (impact). The assessment of simple effectiveness can afford to 
rely on this simplified model of international regimes (Underdal 1992) 
unless it inquires into how and why the institution produces these 
consequences (Young 1999b; Hovi in this volume). In contrast, broader 
consequences are not always immediately apparent. Frequently they 
constitute unintended, even unanticipated, effects of intentional action 
(Martin and Simons 1998) that occur, by definition, beyond the issue areas 
expressly addressed by relevant regimes. Before we can start to assess and 
measure them, we will have to identify areas of possible effects. Therefore, 
the study of broader consequences will need a more complex conception of 
the operation of an international regime that allows us to identify pathways 
of their generation. 
While cooperation does not necessarily require communication (Axelrod 
1984), analysts widely agree to limit regime analysis to international 
institutions that emerge from negotiations (Keohane 1993; Levy et al. 1995). 
Only institutions of this type may be used instrumentally to bring about 
collectively desired change within the international system. What 
distinguishes them from other types of institution is the communication from 
which norms and behavioral guidelines emerge. The establishment of an 
international regime enables actors to act (outside its confines) and 
simultaneously communicate about norms (within these confines), rather 
than merely communicate by action (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986). Actors 
may pollute a regional sea and simultaneously negotiate an arrangement for 
its collective clean-up. Whereas the role of communication had been largely 
ignored as long as regime analysis was predominantly based on non-
cooperative game theory, negotiations and collective decision making have 
recently gained a considerably higher priority both theoretically (Young 
1989. 1994; Morrow 1994; Fearon 1998) and within the effectiveness debate 
(Victor et al. 1998). In a process-oriented perspective, international regimes 
are best understood as decision making systems beyond the nation-state that 
shape the expectations of relevant actors. They are more or less dynamic 
(Gehring 1994) and evolve over time as collective decisions are made and 
practices of governance change. 
Whereas non-communicative evolution of cooperation is characterized 
by its inherent strict limits, negotiations about a cooperative arrangement do 
not have inherent limits. Significant participation in a trade war requires 
resources, while communication about trade preferences does (almost) not. 
Small states and even non-state actors may perfectly well participate in these 
negotiations. Likewise, there are no inherent limits to the deliberate linkage 
of issues. Therefore, negotiation situations tend to become over-complex 
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(Scharpf 1991: 278). All actors interested in cooperation have a common 
interest in the limitation of a negotiation situation, although they may have 
differing ideas about the precise nature of the limitation. They are caught in 
a battle of the sexes - type coordination problem that must be settled in 
occasionally tough pre-negotiations (Gross Stein 1989) before actual 
negotiations may start. 
If successful, negotiations produce a borderline between actors that are 
entitled to participate and those that are not, as well as between subjects that 
are discussed and others that are not. This borderline has no immediate 
corollary in the outside world and it could have been drawn differently. It 
does not have any immediate relevance for action beyond the negotiation 
forum, but it matters for the process of norm-molding by communication. 
Communicative interventions by some actors are now more relevant than 
those by others. Demands and proposals on some issues are more easily 
accommodated within an emerging agreement than others. The borderline 
determines the constellation of interests within the negotiations (Sebenius 
1983, 1991). It matters, for example, whether a cooperation process starts 
with a limited membership and expands progressively, like the Schengen 
and ozone layer regimes, or whether it comprises a huge membership from 
the outset, like the law of the sea and the climate change regimes (Downs et 
al. 1998). Hence, although it is socially constructed, the borderline does not 
at all constitute mere fiction. It is a "social fact" (Searle 1995) that 
influences the output of a negotiation process. Accordingly, in studying 
broader consequences, we should not bother too much with the fact that the 
borders of and between regimes could have been drawn differently, nor that 
they may be changed over time. What matters is that they exist and that they 
are relevant for collective decision making and norm-molding as long as 
they exist. 
A process-oriented perspective on international regimes and the 
relevance of institutionally established boundaries suggests that we 
conceptualize an international regime as a social system that processes 
information (Gehring 2002). Like all systems, it is constituted along the 
distinction between the system and its own environment (Luhmann 1984; 
Willke 1996). The system includes the regime-specific communication 
process and its own (i.e., regime-specific) criteria for the selection of 
relevant information as well as its own rules for transforming information 
into valid norms and other forms of institutional output, such as collectively 
validated knowledge. Whether scientific information matters for collective 
decision making depends on how the collective decision process is 
organized. The system operates entirely according to its own rules, that is, it 
is operationally closed. Yet, it depends on the input of information from its 
environment, for example through negotiations of the actors involved. If 
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they interact in the form of bargaining, the system is sensitive exclusively to 
information about state interests. If they also argue (Elster 1994; Gehring 
1996; Risse 2000) and feed into the process convincing knowledge, and if 
this information gains influence on the collective decision process, the 
system will "observe" other aspects of its environment. The system also 
produces an output. It releases signals into its environment that are relevant 
to outside actors, for example a cooperative arrangement, a decision on the 
noncompliance of a member state, or a report on scientific findings. Hence, 
despite the operative closure of the system, there is a steady exchange of 
signals across the system/environment boundary. 
On this basis we may now distinguish between two different types of 
consequence of regime governance. 
First, the output of a regime may change the environment of addressees. 
Upon adoption of a cooperative arrangement or an important decision, it 
releases a signal into its environment. Although the signal is hardly more 
than the selection of a collectively agreed solution, it may induce a member 
state to adapt its behavior, if (and only if) it is accompanied by the 
expectation that other member states will adapt their behavior accordingly, 
thus promising to bring about cooperation. It may also induce other actors to 
react. Firms and other economic actors expecting government action or 
reactions by relevant other economic actors may be motivated to adapt 
"voluntarily". Political parties and associations may consider a regime 
decision sufficiently relevant for them to adjust their political action. They 
may, for example, launch a campaign for, or against, ratification or 
compliance. 
Second, despite its importance for the success of regime governance, 
output is not the only way in which an international regime may change the 
environment of other social systems. A second way of considerable 
importance for the study of broader consequences is related to the input side. 
The particular way in which an international regime observes its 
environment determines opportunities for action of different actors within 
the communication process. Opportunities for action may be limited to 
states. However, they may extend to non-state actors in control of relevant 
information if, for example, the scientific or technological foundations of 
collective action (Haas 1992) or information about implementation gain 
importance within the institutionalized decision process (Raustiala 1997). 
Increased sensitivity of a regime toward different aspects of its environment 
may. therefore, increase the opportunities for action of previously "weak" 
actors, for example small, relatively powerless, states and non-state actors, 
within the decision process. Changes of the regime-specific decision process 
may induce interested actors, for example environmental NGOs or networks 
of scientists, to develop transnational activities. They may also encourage 
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interested individuals or domestically operating groups to form corporate 
actors capable of exploiting these transnational opportunities (Risse-Kappen 
1995). 
To sum up, the interaction-based conception of international regimes as 
social systems designed to mould norms by communication within a world 
of other social systems and individuals gives some hints as to where to look 
for broader effects. Regimes may generate broader (as well as simple) 
consequences by changing the environment through their generalized 
expectations, or sets of norms. Effects may also be brought about by the 
provision of opportunities for communicative action within the process of 
norm-molding. 
3. KEY AREAS OF BROADER CONSEQUENCES 
RESEARCH 
As consequences of international regimes necessarily imply causation, 
studies the broader consequences of international regimes must clarify the 
variables in the relationships that they intend to study. In this section, 1 
identify some major lines of (actual or possible) inquiry. It should be 
emphasized that identifying key independent and dependent variables does 
not exclude the possibility of feedback loops or co-evolution processes in 
which the direction in the relationship between variables changes. The 
identification of dependent and independent variables is primarily a heuristic 
device to structure the extended field of research on broader consequences 
and a necessary analytic device to explore regime consequences. 
Within the context of regime effectiveness, we wish to study the broader 
consequences of international regimes on some target. This is what 
distinguishes the regime perspective from other studies focusing, for 
example, on changes within the international system or domestic effects of 
international drivers. Accordingly, the independent variable must be related 
to at least one international regime. However, international regimes may 
have broader consequences for virtually all sorts of targets. Hence, we may 
explore effects on an almost unlimited variety of dependent variables. Based 
on current strands of analysis and existing literature, the following four main 
areas of research may be identified. 
Other Issue Area(s). An international regime may have an impact on one 
or more issue-areas beyond its own domain. The evaluation of the simple 
effectiveness of an international regime focuses eventually on its impact on 
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the target problem. If governance is effective, the climate change regime 
must have an observable impact on the state of the global climate. Currently, 
the assessment of the effectiveness of an international regime is largely 
limited to the issue area governed (simple effectiveness). If we intend to 
estimate the net social benefit of an international regime, we will also have 
to assess the externalities caused by a given regime beyond its own domain, 
for example, the effects of the climate change regime on the state of the 
ozone layer and on air pollution, on agriculture and forestry, and on the 
economic performance of the global economy or of national economies. 
The study of externalities in this understanding, which is hardly 
beginning to emerge, may appear in one of two alternative designs. First, 
one may want to explore as far as possible all externalities created by a given 
regime, or an important component of an existing regime, in order to assess 
the net social benefit of, say, the regime for the protection of the ozone layer. 
In this case, the independent variable provides the fixed starting point of 
research, while the dependent variable may have to be modified over time, 
as further externalities in additional issue areas become apparent, or 
anticipated ones prove to be nonexistent. Yet, one may also want to attribute 
an observed effect to a number of existing regimes. For example, the state of 
the environment of the North Sea is not merely affected by the relevant 
regional marine protection regime (OSPARCOM), but also by several global 
marine protection regimes controlling single sources of marine pollution, 
and by the LRTAP regime that affects the extend of acid deposition into the 
North Sea, as well as the regime for the protection of the River Rhine—let 
alone economic regimes such as GATTAVTO that influence the intensity of 
maritime transport (Breitmeier 2000: 46). In this type of "backward 
induction" a researcher attempts to identify suitable independent variables 
(regimes) that explain an observed aggregate effect (the state of marine 
pollution) (see Walter and Zürn in this volume). It is still a limited number 
of clearly identifiable regimes (i.e., a set) to which influence will be 
attributed. Strictly speaking, assessment of the contribution of the "main" 
regime governing the observed issue area, in the example OSPARCOM, 
would fall into the realm of simple effectiveness, while that of more 
marginal regimes, like LRTAP and the River Rhine regime, might constitute 
broader consequences. It appears that the distinction between simple 
effectiveness and broader consequences is not as sharp as may be assumed at 
first glance. It is only heuristically fruitful. 
One may also want to inquire whether international regimes at large 
contribute to increasing, for example, the life expectancy of the population 
in given countries or even all over the world (see Hughes in this volume). 
Studies in this vein also employ a sort of "backward reasoning," starting 
with a readily observable dependent variable that is to be explained by 
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suitable independent variables. Yet, in this case, the question is not whether, 
and to which extent, one or more identified regimes contribute to bringing 
about the observed effect. Rather, it is whether it may be demonstrated that 
the universe of unspecified regimes explains the observed change, or 
whether it must be attributed to some other explanatory variables not related 
to international regimes. In this case, the distinction between simple 
effectiveness and broader consequences diminishes completely. 
International Regime(s). The dependent variable may also be one or 
more international regimes. In recent years, it has been observed that 
international regimes may influence each other. The most widely discussed 
case is the interaction between the Word Trade Organization (GATT/WTO) 
and several international environmental regimes that include trade 
restrictions, like the Basle Convention on the Transboundary Movement of 
Hazardous Wastes, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES), or the Montreal Protocol (see Petersmann 1993; Lang 
1993; Moltke 1997). At closer inspection, issue areas of international 
regimes frequently "overlap" (Stokke 1999), especially in international 
environmental relations (United Nations University 1998, Oberthiir 2001). 
Many subject areas are governed by several institutions with different 
memberships. Moreover, "regime density" (Young 1996) within the 
international system grows steadily and may even increase the prospect of 
interaction between regimes up to the point of eventual "treaty congestion" 
(Brown Weiss 1993: 679). This strand of research challenges the original 
fiction that an isolated regime may be established to deal with an isolated 
international problem. Broader consequences research sets out to replace it 
with the concept of a regime that is embedded within a population of other 
regimes. 
It should be clear then, what a regime is. Some conceptualize regimes so 
as to comprise all social norms relevant for action within a given area of 
international relations, for example the human rights regime (Donnelly 
1986) or the nonproliferation regime (Müller 1993). This overly broad 
conception involves an important analytical problem. It is based on the 
delimitation of the related issue area by the external observer. It does not 
take into account that the actors involved have actually chosen to deal with 
the subject matter in the form of a number of separate agreements emerging 
from distinct negotiation processes. Thus, it implicitly assumes that it does 
not matter how system boundaries are drawn and how collective decision 
making is organized. Practically, this approach would de-emphasize the 
relevance of interaction among these institutions. Others follow a very 
narrow regime concept and conceive of every protocol adopted within the 
regime on long-range transboundary air pollution (LRTAP) as an 
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independent regime (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta 1994). Some regimes, like 
LRTAP, develop by a steadily increasing number of protocols, while others, 
such as the regime for the protection of the ozone layer, do so by successive 
amendments of an existing one. Yet, neither the London nor the Copenhagen 
revisions of the Montreal Protocol have been conceptualized as independent 
regimes so far. The above interaction-based concept suggests that 
international regimes are temporarily or permanently existing decision-
making systems. A regime is then best identified by its system-specific 
communicative interaction process. Accordingly, the LRTAP regime as well 
as the regimes on the protection of the ozone layer and on global climate 
change are best considered as separate regimes, but not the protocols and 
amendments adopted within their framework. This conception allows us, for 
example, to distinguish between a global and a regional regime addressing 
the same substantive problem. Hence, we may examine interaction between 
the International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine 
Mammal Organization (NAMMCO) (Caron 1995), or between the Basle 
regime on hazardous wastes and the Bamako Convention of the African 
countries on the same subject (Meinke 1997, 2002). 
"Ideally," an interaction situation involves two regimes and a single 
direction of influence. In this case we may easily identify a source regime 
(independent variable) and a target regime (dependent variable). 
Alternatively, the dependent variable and/or the independent variable may 
also be a component of a regime or a decision adopted within its framework. 
This will be the case, for example, if we explore the effect of the non-
compliance procedure of the Montreal Protocol on the development of 
implementation control arrangements within the climate change regime or 
within LRTAP and its protocols. We may also take a limited set of 
identifiable regimes as either the independent or the dependent variable. For 
example, we may explore the consequences of a number of environmental 
regimes with trade restrictions for GATT/WTO. We may also inquire into 
the influence of the global London dumping convention on a number of 
regional seas conventions. More complex situations may have to be 
disaggregated to allow causal analysis (see section 4 and Gehring and 
Oberthiir in this volume). 
Hypothetically, we might also want to explore whether the existence of 
the whole population of international regimes has implications, for example, 
for the development of a new regime. Yet, this is a systemic research 
perspective. It asks whether the modern international system with its 
numerous international regimes and organizations has an impact on the 
establishment of a new institution. It falls entirely out of the existing 
literature on regime interaction. Therefore, it is better dealt with it in the 
context of systemic effects. 
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Beside the "regular" cases of regime interaction mentioned, there are two 
specific cases that need some elaboration. The present framework does not 
exclude the possibility that we can explore the consequences of an important 
decision or component that is part of a given regime for another decision or 
component of the same regime. The independent and the dependent 
variables are then chosen from within the same regime. It is exclusively a 
matter of definition whether we consider this case still to be covered by the 
study of broader consequences. Without incurring any theoretical problem, 
we may therefore expand the analytical framework to exploring, for 
instance, the consequences of the N O x Protocol on the Second SOT Protocol 
within the framework of the LRTAP regime. In this vein, we might even 
expand research to the interaction between different instruments (e.g., 
directives) of the European Union. Of course, causal mechanisms and 
empirical effects will be influenced by the fact that these cases are embedded 
in a particular overarching institutional framework within which conflicts 
may be collectively recognized and communicatively settled. But these are 
empirical, not conceptual differences. 
A second specific case that has not yet attracted much attention is the 
exploration of institutional reactions of a regime to its own broader 
consequences. For example, the world trade system does not only affect 
other international regimes (and vice versa). It proscribes discrimination 
between identical goods according to their modes of production (Stevens 
1995; Hudec 1996; Färber and Hudec 1996; Howse 1998). This obligation 
constrains the member states' opportunities for action especially in the areas 
of environmental policy making and regulation of labor conditions. These 
unintended effects generate pressure that might force the institution to 
expand its regulatory activity in order to address the non-economic 
consequences of economic regulation (Schoenbaum 1992; Tarasovsky 1997; 
Esty and Geradin 1998; Charnovitz 1998). In cases like this, the independent 
and the dependent variables are identical, but the transmission of influence 
involves externalities that reach beyond the regime's domain. Once again, it 
is exclusively a matter of definition whether this path is dealt with under the 
heading of broader consequences. 
It should be noted that research on regime interaction significantly 
overlaps with the exploration of regime externalities. Overlap will occur if 
the causal pathway by which a source regime influences a target regime 
involves the creation of externalities. For example, the ozone regime 
generates (malign) effects on the climate change regime because the 
promotion of hydrofluorocarbons contributes to destabilizing the global 
climate. Thus, it reduces the problem-solving capacity of the climate change 
regime. What distinguishes the two areas of inquiry, therefore, is primarily a 
diverging research interest. While externalities research is primarily 
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interested in the impact of an international regime on issue areas beyond its 
own domain, whether it causes adaptations within any regime possibly 
governing the target issue area, the study of regime interaction emphasizes 
the interplay between social institutions, whether or not channeled through 
changes in impact of the issue-areas governed. 
Domestic political system. The study of broader consequences may also 
inquire into the influence of international regimes on a domestic political 
system, or a part of it. Studies of this design adopt a "second image 
reversed'" perspective (Gourevich 1978) that has a long tradition within 
international relations research. What distinguishes research on the domestic 
consequences of international regimes from other "second image reversed" 
studies is their specific focus on the impact of institutions, rather than 
aggregate developments at the international level, as a source of influence. 
Research is still in its very beginnings and a wide range of possible 
dependent variables might be chosen according to the particular research 
interests. 
It may be expected, however, that an important cluster of dependent 
variables will relate to the modification of power relations within 
constellations of actors (e.g., social groups, organized interest groups, state 
organs). Occasionally, a single regime as important as GATTAVTO may 
serve as the independent variable. Hence, if an international institution 
causes significantly increased trade flows, it may be expected to change 
power relations among interest groups within domestic political systems 
(Rogowski 1989; Milner 1988). More often, sets of related regimes may 
constitute the suitable independent variable to assess changes of domestic 
political systems. For example, the existence of human rights standards tends 
to empower interest groups claiming compliance over others that do not 
(Klotz 1995; Forschungsgruppe Menschenrechte 1998; Lutz and Sikking 
2000). Or environmental institutions may effectively support particular 
branches of government (Haas 1990). In yet other cases, the universe of 
regimes constitutes the appropriate independent variable. It has been 
observed that both the European Union, which for these purposes may be 
understood as a particularly well advanced regime, and regular international 
regimes contribute to shifting power from parliaments to the executive 
branch of government (Moravcsik 1994; Wolf 1999; Breitmeier in this 
volume). While the isolated effect caused by any single regime will be 
insignificant, all regimes contribute to the observed effect in basically the 
same way and influence is channeled through virtually a single causal 
pathway. 
Another possible research focus is the influence of international regimes 
on the political status of a domestic political system, or of domestic political 
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systems at large, rather than on the power distribution within it. Hence, one 
may inquire into the level of democracy and human rights in political 
systems, or even attitudes of a population toward democracy and human 
rights, as witnessed by suitable indicators (Hughes in this volume). In this 
case, the independent variable will almost inevitably be the universe of 
(unidentified) regimes, rather than any set of precisely identifiable ones. 
International system. Finally, international regimes may exert influence 
on the international system at large. Regimes may contribute to eroding state 
sovereignty (Litfin 1997). They might have reduced the level of conflict in 
East-West relations prior to the political turn in the Soviet Union (Rittberger 
1990). The emergence and importance of non-state transnational actors, such 
as non-governmental organizations (Princen and Finger 1994, Price 1998) 
and "epistemic communities" of scientists (Haas 1992), is attributed to the 
proliferation of international regimes. Regimes may also foster the relevance 
of international law and the "juridification" of international relations 
(Keohane et al. 2000). Research on the broader consequences of 
international regimes therefore might well contribute to the study of overall 
change in the international system. 
A significant change of international society only rarely will be caused 
by a single regime. Studies intending to identify measurable systemic effects 
will usually take a larger set, or even the whole universe of regimes as the 
independent variable. The aggregate effects of all relevant East-West 
regimes may have reduced the intensity of conflict between the two military 
blocs before 1990. Or the aggregate effects of all international regimes and 
organizations may have contributed to stabilizing peace. 
However, occasionally a single regime may serve as the suitable 
independent variable. Once again, one may think of GATT/WTO as an 
extraordinarily important international regime that may have significantly 
empowered multinational corporations, which are a type of internationally 
operating non-state actors, vis-ä-vis the states, which are the traditionally 
most important actors. A study also may take a single regime as its 
independent variable and explore a causal pathway by which the 
international system is affected. For example, Litfin (in this volume) argues 
that the regime on global climate change forces member states to take into 
account scientific knowledge when determining their action and in this way 
changes existing sovereignty patterns. 
As we move along from the exploration of regime externalities and 
interaction to the assessment of regime consequences on domestic society 
and the international system, the complexity of the dependent variables 
increases significantly. In order to grasp broader consequences, the 
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independent variables usually also will tend to be more highly aggregated. 
We may well explore the externalities generated by a single regime, or even 
by an important component of a regime, that are observable within one or a 
limited number of issue areas beyond its own domain. Likewise, research on 
regime interaction will frequently deal with a constellation in which a single 
regime influences a single target regime. It may also usefully address 
interaction at the level of components, for example if we study the broader 
effects on a target of the emissions trading system envisaged within the Kyo-
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Figure 9.1. Priority areas of broader consequences research. 
to Protocol, rather than the effects of the entire climate change regime. In 
other cases, it will be sets of regimes whose externalities or interaction are 
explored, but these sets will still be composed of a comparatively small 
number of readily identifiable regimes. In contrast, we cannot expect to 
identify some highly aggregated domestic or systemic consequences at the 
level of the single regime, or even of a limited set of identifiable regimes. 
Surely, the effects produced by a single regime may be assumed to 
contribute in one way or another to the broader effect in question, but 
frequently they will be insignificant in isolation, and they are often difficult 
to disentangle from parallel effects caused by other regimes. Hence, broader 
consequences of these types will generally be driven by larger sets of 
regimes or even by the entire population of international regimes existing 
within the international system. 
The main areas of current and presumably of future research on the 
broader consequences of international regimes are summarized in Figure 9.1. 
The rows identify the major independent variables, the columns the major 
dependent ones. Research on the impact of one or more international 
regimes beyond their own domains as well as research on the interaction of 
regimes tend to concentrate on comparatively limited sources of influence. 
Their main independent variable is a single regime, or a component thereof, 
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or a limited set of readily identifiable regimes. In contrast, studies exploring 
regime consequences for domestic political systems and for the international 
system will tend to be based on an independent variable that comprises a 
larger set, or even the entire universe, of regimes. 
4. METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS 
The study of the broader consequences of international regimes does not 
seem to require a completely new methodology, or methods entirely 
unknown to the well-advanced analysis of simple effectiveness and regime 
analysis at large. Nevertheless, despite the wide array of differing research 
interests, each of which poses specific analytical problems, broader 
consequences research differs systematically from the study of simple 
effectiveness in a number of important respects. 
First, the situations bringing about broader consequences are usually 
significantly more complex than those generating simple effects. While the 
exploration of simple effectiveness regularly addresses regime effects on a 
single issue area, the assessment of externalities will frequently deal with a 
number of different issue areas on which a given regime has an impact. 
Likewise, an interaction situation may involve a whole set of regimes 
influencing each other's institutional development and performance. Any 
assessment of the domestic consequences of international regimes or of their 
effects on the international system at large obviously must handle highly 
complex dependent variables. A higher level of complexity renders the 
isolation of clear-cut causal effects more difficult. Compared to the study of 
simple effectiveness, the exploration of broader consequences will therefore 
more often have to rely on the careful disaggregation of independent and 
dependent variables in order to isolate causal effects. 
Second, the broader consequences of one or more international regimes 
will frequently be more remote than effects within their own domains. After 
all, international governance institutions are usually established in order to 
bring about particular effects within their own domains, while their broader 
consequences constitute more diffuse side effects possibly spread over a 
number of different targets. Moreover, these targets usually will be affected 
more directly by other drivers so that any analysis is prone with a possibly 
high number of intervening variables. The consequences of the ozone regime 
for the state of the ozone layer may be assumed to be easier to observe than 
its effects on other issue areas or affected target regimes, let alone its effects 
on domestic society or the international system, because it is a major cause 
of change within its own domain, while it will merely be one among 
numerous other drivers of change with respect to other targets. Hence. 
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broader consequences research will have to invest more attention to the 
careful isolation of comparatively remote and diffuse effects. 
Third, broader consequences will be generated by chains of causation 
that are on average longer than those bringing about simple effects. To be 
sure, this is not always the case. If intensified regulation beyond the nation-
state gradually deprives domestic legislatives of power and thereby tacitly 
changes domestic political systems (Breitmeier in this volume), the causal 
pathway is short and readily observable. Yet, broader consequences do not 
only comprise first-order effects, they may well be caused by second- or 
higher order effects (e.g., an effect of the climate change regime on 
international trade that generates effects on air pollution). Externalities of 
this type are caused in a pathway that may involve a number of different 
issue areas. Likewise, changes of domestic political systems or even of the 
international system generated by international regimes are frequently 
channeled through comparatively long causal chains. The longer a causal 
chain, the more difficult it is to trace, because an observed outcome is 
affected by more intervening variables and may be attributed less clearly to 
the independent variable(s) chosen. 
Fourth, a clearly identifiable and limited independent variable—be it a 
regime, or a component of a regime, or even a set of readily identifiable 
regimes—allows us to employ the qualitative methods most widely used in 
regime analysis. Methods for attributing changes of the dependent variable 
to the independent variable include the construction of counterfactual 
scenarios (Fearon 1991), the exclusion of alternative explanations (Bernauer 
1995: 373: Bierstecker 1993) and, more generally, the search for causal 
pathways (Hovi in this volume). In contrast, some research on broader 
consequences deals with independent variables at a comparatively high level 
of aggregation. Studies of this type will frequently not allow concentration 
on single regimes and the particular causal pathways that are operative. 
Instead, they may have to resort to quantitative analysis. 
These general problems appear in differing combinations and intensity in 
research addressing the four main areas of broader consequences research. In 
the remainder of this section, I will discuss the problems for each of these 
areas separately. 
The evaluation of "externalities," that is of the impact of a regime, a 
regime component, or a set regimes beyond its own domain, is. like the 
dominant branch of effectiveness research, in the first regard related to the 
output side of international regimes. Generally, the evaluation of 
externalities may not seem to be entirely different from assessing the impact 
of a given regime within its own domain. Yet, at close inspection it turns out 
to be prone to two analytic problems. One relates to their empirical mapping 
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of externalities and the other to their scoring into an integrated overall 
assessment of social benefits (Underdal et al. 2000: 17-18). 
The problem of complexity of the analytic situation may be readily dealt 
with by its appropriate disaggregation. If an international regime causes side 
effects in, say, five other issue areas, these externalities may be assessed one 
after the other. What makes the assessment of a regime's externalities 
difficult is the fact that they will usually be less significant than the regime's 
impact within its own domain. Hence, mapping of externalities is hampered 
by the possible insignificance of regime-generated change compared to 
changes caused by other drivers. Moreover, it will be prone to second- or 
higher order effects that necessarily involve longer chains of causation. The 
general advice to deal with these problems is to concentrate on immediate 
rather than remote effects and to keep causal chains as short as possible. 
Research should start with the most significant and readily traceable 
externalities and gradually work toward a more comprehensive assessment. 
The second analytical problem relates to the integration of the 
externalities of an international regime and its impact within its own domain 
into a comprehensive score. It is specific to a particular research design that 
intends to measure the effects of a social institution, but generates particular 
analytical difficulties for broader consequences research. The first step will 
be to distinguish between positive and negative externalities. This is 
comparatively simple for externalities that occur within the issue areas of 
other international regimes. In these cases, we know what the regime 
members collectively (although not necessarily all of them individually) 
consider as benign or malign. If the climate change regime has a degrading 
impact on tropical forests, and if regime members intend to protect tropical 
forests within the biodiversity regime, it will be safe to treat the observed 
effect as a negative externality. But what if it led to changes in agriculture, 
such as the replacement the production of rice by grain or the 
restructurement of farm sizes? Without a yardstick that is collectively agreed 
upon by the actors concerned, appraisal of the direction of side effects will 
be difficult. Hence, it may be fruitful to relate the exploration of impact 
externalities as far as possible to the analysis of interaction between regimes. 
The other, even thornier issue is the attribution of values to different 
externalities and a regime's impact within its own domain. It is the question 
of how much protection of the global climate justifies the degradation of a 
square mile of tropical forest. 
The analysis of regime interaction is heavily process oriented. Interaction 
may occur through rather different causal pathways, including ones that 
involve the creation of externalities beyond the domain of a given regime. 
However, the emphasis is put on the interference of a process of governance 
by another process of governance. Therefore, interaction always includes an 
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input dimension. The central problem for the analysis of regime interaction 
is the fact that interaction situations are frequently complex (Gehring and 
Oberthiir in this volume). More often than not influence is not well directed 
and asymmetrical. It may run back and forth between the regimes involved 
(Young 1996). For example, the global London dumping convention and the 
regional Oslo dumping convention co-developed for almost thirty years and 
may be expected to have exerted multifaceted influence on each other. Other 
situations include a whole set of regimes that affect each other in different— 
and usually unknown—ways. In these cases, the regimes involved constitute 
the dependent and the independent variable at the same time. This 
constellation precludes any serious causal analysis (see Carlsnaes 1992). 
Even a situation limited to two regimes will be too complex for causal 
analysis, if the institutions affect each other reciprocally or if influence is 
channeled through more than one causal pathway. Therefore, many studies 
exploring complicated regime interaction situations do not reach far beyond 
description and are not able to respond to the core question of this strand of 
research: under which conditions and transmitted by which causal 
mechanisms do international regimes interact, rather than merely co-exist ? 
To allow causal analysis, the variables must not be too highly aggregated. 
A complex interaction situation may always be disaggregated into a number 
of cases of interaction that include not more than two regimes and have a 
clear direction of influence running from the target regime toward the source 
regime. Accordingly, a set of regimes should be disaggregated into a number 
of bilateral relations. For example, if we explore the consequences of one 
source regime on a whole set of target regimes, it will almost always be 
better to disaggregate the multi-regime interaction into a number of bilateral 
ones (see Gehring and Oberthiir in this volume). We may investigate the 
influence of the Basle hazardous wastes regime on the development of 
several regional seas regimes by exploring in depth its effect on each 
regional seas regime separately. We might then discover that the situation 
includes additional cases of interaction, for example ones between the 
regional seas regimes in question, or ones feeding back from these regimes 
to the original source regime. Thus we may identify quite a number of 
separate incidents of interaction, each of which is based on a clear causal 
chain. Likewise, it may be useful to disaggregate interaction patterns 
between two regimes into more limited incidents, especially if feedback 
processes occur over time. While the appropriate unit of analysis is a single 
case of interaction rather than interaction between two or more regimes at 
large, the interaction pattern of the overall situation will become apparent as 
soon as the cases are re-aggregated. 
Disaggregation of complex situations into a suitable number of clear-cut 
cases of interaction will usually contribute to isolating causal effects and 
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clarify, albeit probably not shorten, the length of causal chains. Moreover, it 
allows us to start with an assessment of the most clear-cut cases and the most 
readily traceable causal pathways and gradually work toward more difficult 
cases. Thus, disaggregation contributes to mitigating the problems of 
remoteness of causal influence and of long causal pathways. 
The analysis of domestic or systemic effects of international regimes is 
also highly sensitive to the problem of complexity. Situations may be 
difficult to examine as to the causality of influence because they involve 
many regimes and different causal pathways. Studies with a trend-
discovering design that are directed at exploring causal pathways rather than 
measuring aggregate effects (see Breitmeier and Litfin in this volume) may 
thus be well advised to limit their analysis to either a single regime or a 
single type of causal pathway at a time. However, more often than not, 
domestic and systemic effects will hardly be attributable to a single regime. 
The assessment of regime consequences for domestic society and the 
international system deals not only with highly complex dependent 
variables, it will frequently also require a comparatively highly aggregated 
independent variable. In these cases it may be useful to employ quantitative 
rather than, or complementary to, qualitative analytical methods. Resort to 
the statistical assessment of effects and the successive exclusion of 
alternative explanatory variables opens broader consequences research for 
the analysis of aggregate effects that are difficult to approach by qualitative 
methods. For example, Hughes (in this volume) explores whether observed 
changes in life expectancy and attitudes toward democracy may be attributed 
to the existence of the universe of regimes. 
For the analysis of the broader consequences, this approach poses two 
major problems, both related to the establishment of causality. First, effects 
at a high level of aggregation may generally be attributed to a number of 
independent variables. An important task will be to control as many of these 
variables as possible sufficiently well to isolate the influence of regimes as 
the explanatory factor of interest. Otherwise, one will merely identify room 
for possible influence of the universe of regimes on some highly aggregated 
social indicators, which may be filled as well by a number of rival 
explanatory factors. Second, correlation does not yet say anything about the 
direction of causal influence. Are more favorable attitudes toward 
democracy caused by the existence of international regimes, or is the 
emergence of regimes, for example in the area of human rights, better 
explained by changes in these attitudes? Since the direction of causality is 
essential for consequences research, it may be necessary to complement 
statistical analysis with the construction of causal models that may be tested 
subsequently. 
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The analysis of systemic effects of international regimes poses another, 
more specific problem. The international system is not fully independent 
from its components, including international regimes. It does not need 
further elaboration that regimes form parts of the institutionalized 
international system and are thus nested within an even larger international 
institution (Buzan 1993; Young 1996). There is nothing special about this 
kind of nesting of institutions. Think of a political party that is part of a 
national political system. What matters here is that the higher order 
institution changes automatically with any modification of a lower order 
institution. The international system is automatically affected by the 
establishment of an international regime or the adoption of a significant 
decision within a regime, much as the political system of a nation-state 
changes more or less profoundly with the foundation of a new political 
party. If an international regime encourages actors to adopt collective 
decisions by arguing rather than pure bargaining, it contributes to 
"rationalizing" collective decision-making within the international system in 
the Habermasian sense (Habermas 1981). If it opens collective decision 
processes to non-state actors, it contributes to undermining the 
predominance of state actors. It is important to recognize that these changes 
of the international system are mere aggregate descriptions of developments 
occurring elsewhere, rather than separate systemic effects, because the cause 
and the target variables are not independent of each other. Only if actors 
behave differently because there are so many regimes in the international 
system that provide opportunities for action to non-state actors, or that 
rationalize interaction in a Habermasian sense, we will be faced with an 
originally systemic effect. 
Therefore, we should be clear, when analyzing systemic effects, whether 
we mean effects that occur at a lower level within the system, that is within 
one or more international regimes, or whether we mean original 
modifications of the international system beyond the aggregate effects 
attributable to the individual regimes. If we take the international system as 
the aggregate of developments taking place at a lower level, then the system 
will change all the time. Therefore, it is of little interest to state that some 
effect occurring at the regime level changes the international system. Rather, 
we will want to discover trends of more profound systemic change of which 
a regime-level effect is a mere indicator. If we are looking for original 
systemic effects, we must conceptualize the system separately from its 
components. 
The detection of profound trends of systemic change is hampered by the 
fact that the international system is unique and we lack an immediate 
comparison that might inform us what a profoundly changing system looks 
like. Accordingly, we are faced with the problem of anticipating future 
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outcomes on the basis of minor indicators in the present or immediate past 
(see Walter and Zürn in this volume). In the first step, we may identify an 
institutionally driven causal mechanism that changes the nature of 
interaction prevailing within the international system. Does a particular 
regime favor scientifically based over interest-based interventions? Or is it 
particularly open to influence of otherwise weak actors (such as NGOs or 
small states)? This step involves two analytical problems. The identification 
of changes in the regular interaction requires a standard of what is to be 
expected "normally." Usually we do not dispose of an empirical standard 
that would tell us how international actors behave on average. Therefore, we 
need some model of regular behavior that must be sufficiently realistic to be 
useful. If we take a crude rational choice standard of unilaterally chosen 
strategic action, we will see modifications almost everywhere. If we assume 
that actors regularly behave according to norms (logic of appropriateness) 
(March and Olson 1989) and communicative action (Risse 2000), and that 
non-state actors are widely recognized as relevant participants 
(Keck/Sikking 1998), we might not find any significant modification of 
standard behavior. The second analytical problem is related to the impact of 
changes in interaction on the output in terms of regulatory decisions or 
norms. The mere presence of NGOs or scientists in regime negotiations does 
not necessarily indicate that these actors influence the output significantly. 
Once again, we need a counterfactual analysis ("how would states have done 
in the absence of non-state actors") and the exclusion of alternative 
explanations ("might states have achieved a similar result on their own?") 
Changes occurring within a particular regime automatically constitute 
changes of the international system, but they are normally of limited 
significance. In order to identify significant system-level effects, we must 
explore whether similar changes occur in other regimes, that is whether 
international regimes systematically modify the international system in the 
identified way. In the second step, we might thus substitute a particular 
regime with a larger set of regimes. We may quite confidently assume that 
East-West regimes generally reduce the level of conflict in comparison with 
the parallel non-regime situations (Rittberger 1990). But do regimes 
generally favor science-based over power-based decisions? Are they 
generally open to significant influence of nongovernmental groups? If not, 
we may still project an alleged trend into the future: Does the number of 
regimes with relevant properties grow over-proportionally? May it be 
expected to increase further so that it must be assumed to become a wide-
spread phenomenon in the future? If we are able to respond to these 
questions in the affirmative, we may have discovered a system-wide trend of 
change that is still exclusively based on developments taking place at the 
regime level. 
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In order to identify original system-level effects, we must push the 
analysis one step further and ask whether the observed aggregate change 
leads to consequences beyond the effects that occur at the regime level. Can 
it be established that the behavior of states involved in the East-West conflict 
changed significantly even in non-regime situations because of the 
establishment of East-West regimes? This effect could not be attributed to 
the single regimes any more; it would constitute an additional effect that had 
to be attributed to the simultaneous existence of many regimes, that is, to the 
system. If internationally acting nongovernmental organizations could 
launch an attack on GATTAVTO or lead a campaign for a new regime 
against landmines (Price 1998), because they had acquired their ability to do 
so in the context of environmental and human rights regimes, we would have 
detected a new type of actor in the international system whose action had 
became independent of a particular regime. Only effects of this type are truly 
located at the system level. 
5. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE STUDY OF 
BROADER CONSEQUENCES 
International regimes produce consequences that reach far beyond their 
own domains. So far. regime analysis has largely avoided tackling these 
broader consequences. It operated under the implicit assumption that the 
most important effects may be found within the issue areas governed by a 
given regime. However, the broader consequences of single international 
regimes or of the increasing population of regimes within the international 
system are far from negligible. In some cases, they may be as important as 
the simple effects. At the very least, they merit considerably more scholarly 
attention than they have received in the past. 
International regimes may have important effects on very different 
targets. Their output in the form of material norms (rights and obligations) 
may affect the action of state-actors, transnational actors, and sub-national 
actors alike and cause secondary consequences on all levels of human 
interaction. Depending on their specific input of information, regimes also 
provide opportunities for action not only for states, but also for transnational 
and sub-national actors. Hence, the process of generating regulation 
becomes a factor that gains importance for certain types of consequence. 
Therefore, it seems advisable not to base research of broader consequences 
from its very beginning on an under-complex conception of international 
regimes that might prove to be too narrow to grasp important types of 
consequence. 
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Considering the almost unlimited expansion of this new area of research, 
any serious research program will have to concentrate on a number of 
important aspects. The present paper identifies four research priorities that 
either exist within the current literature or have been identified as meriting 
future attention. These priorities may be expected to constitute the core of 
dependent variables within the emerging new field of study. The exploration 
of the externalities produced by a regime beyond its "own" issue area 
constitutes an immediate extension of the existing research on the simple 
effectiveness of international regimes. A second research priority that has, in 
light of an increasing number of independently established international 
regimes, already attracted considerable interest of both scholars and policy 
makers is devoted to the study of interaction between regimes. Another 
strand of research focuses on regime effects on domestic political systems, 
and a last priority concentrates on exploring changes of the international 
system that may be attributed to international regimes. Whereas the 
exploration of externalities is closely related to the assessment of the simple 
effectiveness of international regimes, both the domestic effects of 
internationalization and globalization and the changing nature of the 
international system are intensely discussed in the literature. The study of the 
broader effects of international regimes may draw on these extensive 
research traditions. It promises to contribute to these literatures in particular 
by developing the role of regimes as drivers for processes of change, that is 
by emphasizing an independent variable that has gained comparatively little 
specific attention so far. Surprisingly, the analysis of regime interaction 
relies on the least well-developed conceptual foundation of the four research 
areas. 
Generally, the exploration of the broader consequences of international 
regimes does not seem to require an entirely new methodology or methods 
that are completely unknown in traditional regime analysis. However, 
broader consequences research differs in a number of respects from the 
assessment of simple effectiveness. Situations will tend to be more complex, 
while effects will tend to be more remote than simple effects and rely on 
longer chains of causation. If we attempt to attribute broad changes of 
societies to the universe of regimes, all the analytic problems of quantitative 
macro-analysis will turn up. 
Despite these analytical difficulties, the multifaceted and newly 
developing research area devoted to the study of the broader consequences 
of international regimes opens a fascinating and politically highly relevant 
new perspective on the effects of governance within the international 
system. 
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NOTES 
1 This section draws on the discussion of the 1999 Oslo Workshop of the Concerted Action 
Network on the Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes (Breitmeier 2000). 
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